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Abstract
Individuals respond to the risk of infectious diseases by restricting interaction and by
investing in protection. We develop a model that examines the trade-off between these
two actions and the consequences for disease prevalence.
There exists a unique equilibrium: individuals who invest in protection choose to
interact more relative to those who do not invest in protection. Changes in the conta-
giousness of the disease have non-monotonic effects: as a result interaction initially falls
and then rises, while disease prevalence too may initial increase and then decline.
We then consider a society with two communities that differ in their returns from
interaction – High and Low. Individuals in isolated communities exhibit different be-
havior: the High community has a higher rate of protection and interaction and a lower
rate of infection. Integration amplifies these differences.
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1 Introduction
Interactions between individuals generate benefits but also facilitate the spread of viruses
and infections. This tension is salient in infectious diseases such as influenza, HIV and tu-
berculosis.1 Infectious diseases spread primarily through contact between human beings: so
prevalence can be reduced through restricting interaction and by investing in protection. This
paper develops a model that examines the trade-off between these two courses of action and
its consequences for the prevalence of diseases.
In our model, a population of individuals faces a disease. Every individual chooses how
much to interact with others and whether or not to protect himself. Interactions generate
benefits but increase the risk of infection from infected others. There is a fixed cost to protec-
tion; for simplicity it is assumed that protection ensures immunity from disease. Individuals
who protect themselves thus choose the maximal feasible interaction level. The protection
rate, the interaction level, and the contagiousness of the disease determine disease prevalence
(i.e., the infection rate).
We first establish that a (Nash) equilibrium exists and is unique. For a broad class of cir-
cumstances, equilibrium protection rates are interior: only a part of the population protects.
Individuals who invest in protection interact more than those who do not. Restricted inter-
action and protection are substitutes. This relation is consistent with empirical observation.
For example, in their well known study on British sexual attitudes and behavior, Wellings et
al. (1994) report a positive correlation between the frequency of new partners and the use of
condoms.
The contagiousness of a disease is a key parameter in the study of epidemics.2 We find
that equilibrium response to contagiousness is non-monotonic. There exists a threshold level
of contagiousness: below this value, protection rates are zero, and the response to higher
contagiousness is through reduced interaction. This is because below a threshold incurring
1There are 3 to 5 million cases of acute influenza and between 250,000 and 500,000 deaths are attributed to
this infection, annually. In 2012, over 8.5 million people were infected with tuberculosis and 1.3 million deaths
were attributed to it. In the same year, 2.3 million new cases of AIDS were reported and over 1.5 million
people died due to the disease; over 36 million people have died due to HIV/AIDS so far (WHO (2013, 2014a,
2014b)).
The Internet reflects a similar tension: on-line interactions generate rewards but may serve as a conduit for
the spread of viruses and worms which compromise user value. As energy, communication, travel, consumer
interaction increasingly adopt digital networks, cybersecurity has emerged as a major concern. We discuss the
relevance of our analysis for cybersecurity later in the introduction.
2For a classical exposition of the theory of epidemiology, see Anderson and May (1991). For a recent survey
on epidemics, see Gersovitz (2011).
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the fixed cost of protection is not worthwhile. Above the threshold, the returns from protection
outweigh the fixed costs of protection. Greater contagiousness now induces greater protection
and a corresponding increase in interaction. Infection rates too may vary non-monotonically
– initially increasing and then declining – in contagiousness.
In our basic model individuals are homogenous. We then turn to a society with two com-
munities that differ in their returns from interaction – High and Low. Individuals in isolated
communities exhibit different behavior: the High community has a higher rate of protection
and interaction. As communities integrate, protection and interaction further increase in
the High community while they fall in the Low community. Integration thus leads to a fall
(increase) in disease prevalence in the High (Low) community.
The theoretical prediction on the relation between returns and equilibrium behavior is
broadly consistent with empirical observation. Wellings et al. (1994) report that single people
have more partners and are much more likely to use condoms as compared to cohabiting
couples. Philipson and Posner (1993) report a negative correlation between education/income
and HIV infection: they surmise that higher income raises the returns from the future and
thereby leads to greater investments in protection (the use of condoms). This in turn lowers
the rate of infection.
Our model and its predictions are also related to cybersecurity.3 The equilibrium property
of positive correlation between protection and interaction is consistent with the findings of
Anderson et al. (2007) and Moore, Clayton and Anderson (2011) on the positive relation be-
tween investments in security and Internet use. The model predicts that the High community
will have higher protection and interaction: this is consistent with the fact that larger firms
are more active in securing themselves as compared to smaller firms (Anderson et al (2007)).
Our paper is a contribution to the economic study of epidemics and cybersecurity. It is
useful to separate the existing research in economic epidemiology into two strands. The first
strand of work takes interaction as given and explores the response in protection rates. This
work includes Brito, Sheshinski and Intriligator (1991), Geoffard and Philipson (1996, 1997),
Francis (1997), Goldman and Lightwood (2002), Gersovitz and Hammer (2004), Galeotti and
Rogers (2013), and Chen and Toxvaerd (2014). A second (and complementary) group of
3Estimates of the costs of cyber crime vary greatly. A recent study estimates the costs to be in the range
of 300 billion USD to 1 trillion USD; this is between 0.4% and 1.4% of global GDP. A recent study for the UK
Cabinet Office reported that the cost to the UK economy is over 27 billion USD per annum (Detica, (2011)).
In 2009, roughly 10 million computers were infected with malware designed to steal online credentials. The
annual damages caused by malware is of the order of 9.3 billion Euros in Europe, while in the US the annual
costs of identity theft are estimated at 2.8 billion USD (Moore, Clayton and Anderson (2009)).
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papers assumes that protection is absent and studies the response in interaction. This work
includes Philipson and Posner (1993) and Kremer (1996). To the best of our knowledge, the
present paper is the first attempt to provide a unified treatment of interaction and protection.
The analysis yields a number of new insights; we highlight two of them via a comparison with
the benchmark models.
Compared to the ‘pure’ protection benchmark our model yields lower rates of protection.
This is because part of the population foregoes protection and responds instead by adapt-
ing interaction. But compared to that benchmark, infection rates are higher in our model.
This tells us that differences in protection are ‘insufficiently’ compensated for by restricted
interaction.
Next, consider the benchmark where interaction is the only choice variable (and there
exists no protection). The more an unprotected individual interacts, the greater the chances
that he becomes infected and, in turn, transmits the disease to others around him. Thus an
increase in returns from interaction unambiguously raises the infection rate (Kremer (1996)).
In our setting, on the other hand, the more individuals value interaction the less inclined they
are to respond to an epidemic by reducing interaction. This implies that higher returns from
interaction lead to higher protection rates and – in sharp contrast to the pure interaction
benchmark – to lower infection.
Our results have potential policy implications. A first order implication is that demand
for protection will be lower in a model where interaction levels are a choice variable.4 An
important insight from the economic models of epidemiology is the externality in individual
protection. In our model, choosing protection creates an additional externality: protected
individuals interact more and this alters the pool of contacts. We show that this expands the
scope for policy intervention, as compared to the benchmark model of pure protection. Finally,
our work suggests that subsidies on protection should target those valuing social interaction
least, as doing so minimizes crowding-out effects.
The problem of computer network security has been extensively studied in electrical en-
gineering and computer science; for an overview of this work see Alpcan and Basar (2011)
and Anderson (2011). Aspnes, Chang and Yampolskiy (2006) (and the literature that follows
them) study protection choices by nodes faced with a viral infection that spreads through a
4The experience with swine flu vaccines is worth mentioning in this regard. Most OECD countries have
large stocks of swine flu vaccines; for instance, in England, the NHS stock is estimated to have around 40
million vaccines in stock. This large stock of vaccines has provoked much discussion in recent years, see e.g.,
Times (2010). Our theoretical result points to one relatively unexplored reason for this large stock: lowered
international travel and interaction in response to public measures on quarantine and the fears of epidemic.
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given network. Our paper contributes to this literature by proposing a general framework in
which interaction (network) and security investments are both endogenous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section
3 contains the analysis of the basic model. Section 4 studies the model with heterogenous
individuals. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Model
Social interaction. We consider a continuum of individuals with measure one, labeled by
[0, 1]. A typical individual, denoted by i, interacts with others in the population according to
ki ∈ R+. We can think of ki as the number of hours which individual i spends drinking in a bar
(or in on-line activity) every day.5 Each hour, i strikes up conversation with another person,
who he picks uniformly at random.6 For an arbitrary subset A of individuals in the population
and at any hour of the day, individuals in A constitute fraction (
∫
i∈A kidi)(
∫
i∈[0,1] kidi)
−1 of all
individuals present in the bar. The probability that a new meeting of i is with an individual
in subset A is thus given by:
probability of new meeting within A =
∫
i∈A kidi∫
i∈[0,1] kidi
.
We suppose that ki is a choice variable for individual i. Let ri(ki) ≥ 0 denote the payoff
of i from interacting according to ki. We let
ri(ki) := θig(ki), (1)
where θi denotes the type of individual i. We will assume that g(0) = 0, g
′(.) > 0 and g′′(.) ≤ 0
if ki < k, and g(k) = g(k), for all k > k. All individuals thus maximize interaction returns at
k. Higher θi may reflect greater returns from interaction due to differences in human, physical
or financial capital.
The example of linear returns from interaction is a simple special case of our model:
5We borrow this example from Kremer (1996).
6We relax this assumption in Section 4, when considering heterogenous populations.
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Example 1 Linear returns.
g(k) =
{
k if 0 ≤ k ≤ k
k if k > k
(2)
A population is (ex ante) homogenous if all individuals have the same type, i.e. θi = θ for
all i, and heterogenous otherwise. Section 3 studies homogenous populations; section 4 takes
up the case of heterogenous populations.
Epidemics. The population faces an infectious disease. Individuals become infected exoge-
nously with probability , where  > 0. They can also be infected via interaction with other
infected individuals. We let α denote the contagiousness of the disease, i.e. the probability of
contracting the disease from interacting with an infected individual. The (total) probability
that individual i becomes infected is given by
pi = + (1− )
(
1− (1− αqi)ki
)
, (3)
where qi denotes the probability of meeting an infected individual. We assume that α is small
so that we can approximate pi as
pi = + (1− )αqiki. (4)
Protection. In addition to choosing how much to interact, each individual chooses whether
or not to protect himself. Protection costs γ > 0, and immunizes the individual to the disease.
The cost may be financial (as in the purchase of a condom, a vaccine or a computer security
software) or it may reflect direct disutility (as in the case of condoms, or possible side-effects
in the case of a vaccine). The binary variable vi records the protection status of individual
i: vi = 1 if individual i protects, and vi = 0 otherwise. We will say that an individual
is unprotected or susceptible if vi = 0. The protection rate V denotes the fraction of the
population which protects. We let I denote the infection rate, i.e. the fraction of individuals
in the population who are infected:
I :=
∫
i∈[0,1]
(1− vi)pidi. (5)
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Remark: We have opted for a simple formulation of protection: the costs are invariant
with respect to level of interaction. This is a good model for a vaccine and for computer
security software, but appears to be inappropriate for condoms where protection costs vary
with frequency of interaction. We note that our main results continue to hold with variable
costs of protection so long as the choice for protection is made ex-ante and applies to all
interactions.
Payoffs. Infected individuals receive zero payoffs. Uninfected/healthy individuals enjoy re-
turns from interaction given by (1). An unprotected individual’s expected payoff is thus7
Πi(ki, vi = 0) =
(
1− pi
)
ri(ki), (6)
with pi given by (4). A protected individual’s expected payoff is
Πi(ki, vi = 1) = ri(ki)− γ. (7)
Equilibrium. The structure of the game as well as the distribution of types in the popu-
lation are common knowledge. The model defines a game of complete information between
individuals. We study the Nash equilibria of this game; an equilibrium is said to be interior
if the protection rate V ∈ (0, 1).
3 Analysis
This section presents our analysis of the choice of adaptive interaction and protection and
its implications for infection in homogenous populations. We establish that there exists a
unique equilibrium. In an interior equilibrium, some individuals protect and opt for maximal
interaction, while others remain unprotected and economize on interaction. A rise in returns
from interaction leads to greater interaction and protection and to lower infection. A rise in
contagiousness of the disease has a non-monotonic effect on interaction: it initially falls but
eventually rises. Protection is monotonically increasing; in an interior equilibrium, a rise in
contagiousness lowers infection rates.
7A simple way to account for risk aversion is to replace (6) by Πi(ki, vi = 0) =
(
1− pi
)
ri(ki)− cpi, where
c represents the cost of uncertainty for susceptible individuals. All results and proofs in this paper apply
mutatis mutandis under this alternative specification. We are grateful to a referee for drawing our attention
to risk aversion.
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Our first result establishes existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider a homogenous population. An equilibrium exists and is unique.
It is useful to briefly describe the ways in which interaction and protection shape the payoffs
of the unprotected individual. The negative externality exerted by unprotected individuals is
governed by the incidence q of the disease – the probability that an individual with whom an
individual interacts is infected. The incidence of the disease can be written as the product of
two terms: (i) the probability z of meeting a susceptible individual, and (ii) the probability p
that a susceptible is in fact infected.
Since the incidence faced by all individuals is the same, and the payoff function is strictly
concave in interaction, then all unprotected individuals must in any equilibrium choose the
same interaction level. Let ku denote the interaction of unprotected individuals in a given
equilibrium. Since k maximizes protected individuals’ payoffs, the probability of meeting a
susceptible is:
z =
ku(1− V )
ku(1− V ) + kV
. (8)
Substituting q = zp in (4) and solving for p yields
p =

1− (1− )αzku . (9)
A pair (V, ku) constitutes an (interior) equilibrium if and only if protected and unprotected
individuals have equal payoffs, and
ku = arg max
k
(1− )(1− αzpk)r(k) (10)
with z and p satisfying, respectively, equations (8) and (9).
Now the proof of the Proposition follows in two steps. We first consider the pure interaction
game given a fixed protection rate V – this is a game played among unprotected individuals
choosing how much to interact when the remaining fraction V of the population protects. We
show that this is a game of strategic substitutes, with a unique equilibrium. The ‘equilibrium’
payoffs attained in the pure interaction game are strictly increasing and continuous in the
protection rate V . As payoffs from protection are invariant, existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium in the overall game of protection and interaction follows.
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The trade-off between restricted interaction and protection plays a central role in our
model. To illustrate its role, we now compare our equilibrium with (a) the equilibrium of
the ‘pure’ protection model with interaction fixed exogenously at the no-disease optimum
k (benchmark 1) and (b) the equilibrium of the ‘pure’ interaction model with no protection
(benchmark 2), respectively. We consider here the contrast between our model and benchmark
model 1; the contrast with benchmark model 2 is developed after the statement of Proposition
3 below.
An important insight from the economic models of epidemiology is that a part of the
benefits from protection is the reduced risk of infecting others: something that agents fail
to internalize. In our model, choosing protection creates an additional externality compared
to the benchmark model 1: protected individuals interact more and this alters the pool of
contacts. This remark suggests that the scope for policy intervention may be greater when
individuals can adapt social interaction as compared to the benchmark of pure protection. Our
next result illustrates this point in two ways. First, we show that public protection programs
may prove superfluous in benchmark 1, and yet be socially desirable in our framework of
adaptive interaction. Second, we show that adaptive interaction ultimately induces higher
rates of infection. Let (V ∗, I∗) and (V 1, I1) denote the equilibrium protection and infection
rates in our model and benchmark model 1, respectively.
Proposition 2 Consider a homogenous population.
1. V ∗ ≤ V 1, with strict inequality if V ∗ and V 1 ∈ (0, 1).
2. V ∗ and V 1 ∈ (0, 1)⇒ I∗ > I1.
The proof of the first part builds on the observation that, for any given rate of protection,
the resulting incidence of the disease is higher with fixed interaction as compared to the case
where unprotected individuals adapt (and hence lower) interaction. This pushes up the returns
from protection, inducing higher protection rates. The second part is more delicate: protection
is higher in the benchmark model, but adaptive interaction in our model may compensate for
the difference in protection rates. Our proof shows that while interaction adapts downward,
it does so ‘insufficiently’. As a result, incidence and infection are both higher in our model,
as compared to the benchmark model 1.
We turn next to the comparative static implications of the choice between reduced inter-
action and protection. An increase in returns from interaction makes the former option less
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attractive and this in turn enhances the appeal of protection. We will say that interaction
undergoes a cross-sectional increase/decrease if all individuals interact more/less.
Definition 1 A profile of interaction
(
k′i
)
i∈[0,1] constitutes a cross-sectional increase of
(
ki
)
i∈[0,1]
if and only if, up to relabeling of the individuals: k′i ≥ ki for all i, with strict inequality for
some subset of individuals with measure strictly greater than zero.
Let V (θ) denote the equilibrium protection rate in homogeneous populations with type θ.
Proposition 3 Suppose V (θ) ∈ (0, 1). An increase in returns to interaction, θ leads to a
cross-sectional increase in interaction and raises protection. If the returns function g(k) is
given by (2) an increase in θ lowers infection rates.
At an interior equilibrium, changes in θ must leave individuals indifferent between protec-
tion and no protection. As protected individuals interact according to k, their payoffs increase
at the rate g(k) (viz. (1)). Susceptibles’ payoffs on the other hand increases at the lesser rate
(1− p)g(ku), and must therefore be compensated by a decrease in the incidence q = zp. But
the optimal interaction ku must then increase in θ.
Next consider protection. If the protection rate were decreasing in θ, the probability z
of meeting a susceptible would increase in θ. The infection probability p would increase too
(viz. (9)), leading in turn to an increase in the incidence q = zp and contradicting our
previous observation that incidence is falling in θ. The protection rate thus increases in θ.
Since susceptible interaction increases, an increase in θ leads to a cross-sectional increase in
interaction.
Finally, consider the infection rate. The protection rate is increasing, thus setting a decreas-
ing upper bound on the infection rate. However, interaction of the unprotected is increasing
too. The key issue is therefore the elasticity of interaction. If this elasticity is sufficiently
low then the higher protection rate will prevail. Observe that the infection rate is given by
I(θ) = p(θ)(1− V (θ)), where p(θ) denotes the equilibrium probability of infection in a popu-
lation with type θ. We show by direct computation that if payoffs are given by (2), then p(θ)
is constant.8
Proposition 3 is helpful in bringing out the differences between our model and the ‘pure’
interaction benchmark model 2. In the absence of protection, the more individuals value
8In fact, the result developed here holds more generally – provided the elasticity of interaction with respect
to contagiousness is no more than 1.
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interaction, the greater the negative externality each agent imposes on others. This in turn
implies that in the pure interaction benchmark an increase in θ unambiguously raises the
incidence and hence the infection rate (Kremer (1996)). As Proposition 3 demonstrates, in
our model the effects of increasing returns to interaction θ are very different. The more
individuals value interaction, the less inclined they are to respond to an epidemic by reducing
interaction: this pushes up the protection rate and leads to falling infection rates for a broad
class of models.
We turn finally to the effects of contagiousness on behavior and infection rates. Our
analysis establishes that there are two phases in the equilibrium response to contagiousness. In
phase I, at low α, the response to higher contagiousness is entirely through reduced interaction.
In phase II, at high α, greater contagiousness induces more protection but there is no reduction
of social interaction. Hence, somewhat surprisingly, social interaction is non-monotonic in
contagiousness: it first decreases but eventually rises.
Proposition 4 Consider a homogenous population. Equilibrium protection increases with
contagiousness. There exist α and α, α ≤ α, such that:
1. If α < α then an increase in α leads to a cross-sectional decrease in interaction. Infection
rate changes depend on the elasticity of interaction with respect to α.
2. If α < α < α then an increase in α leads to a cross-sectional increase in interaction and
a fall in the infection rate.
We start by observing that if V = 0 then the negative externality exerted by unpro-
tected individuals is strictly increasing in contagiousness, α. This implies that interaction of
unprotected individuals, ku, decreases in α and completes the arguments for part 1.
Next consider an interior equilibrium: an individual must be indifferent between protection
and no protection. Since payoffs from protection are unaffected by α, the payoffs earned by
susceptibles must be unchanged as well. This implies that the externality αq(α) remains
constant in α. As α is rising, the incidence q(.) must be falling. Now consider protection.
Suppose that protection is falling in α. Then the only way to reduce the incidence q(α)
would be to reduce the interaction ku. But we have already proven that the externality
αq(α) is constant in α, and so is ku. This contradiction establishes that protection rates
must be increasing in α. As susceptible interaction is constant and the fraction of protected
individuals rises, it follows that an increase in contagiousness leads to a cross-sectional increase
in interaction. This completes the argument for part 2.
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Figure 1
We conclude with a discussion on the effect of contagiousness on infection rates. Kremer
(1996) observes that (in the absence of protection) higher contagiousness may lead to lower
infection rates if the elasticity of interaction with respect to contagiousness is greater than
one. The remark on infection rates in the first part follows similar logic.
The contrast is, however, sharp if we look at infection rates in an interior equilibrium (when
α ∈ (α, α): in this case higher contagiousness always lowers infection rates. The idea is as
follows. The externality αq(α) remains constant over this range. The probability of infection
of an unprotected individual must therefore remain unchanged as well. The infection rate
then falls, since the protection rate is rising in α.
4 Heterogenous populations
This section studies the effect of population heterogeneity on behavior and infection rates.
We model heterogeneity in terms of differences in returns from interaction. Our goal is to
examine the interplay between this heterogeneity and the choice between restricted interaction
and protection. Observe that the case where the different ‘types’ of individuals are completely
segregated is covered by Proposition 3 above. Our analysis reveals that the integration level
between different types has powerful effects on behavior and infection rates.
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We shall suppose that a heterogenous population consists of two equal size communities of
individuals with types θH and θL respectively, θH > θL. A parameter β measures integration
between the two communities. With probability β (resp., 1 − β), social interaction takes
place across communities (resp., within one’s own community). Thus, for β = 0 the two
communities of individuals are completely segregated, while for β = 1 all interaction takes
place across communities.9 The probability that a new meeting of an individual in community
J is with an individual in subset A ⊂ J ′ is thus:
probability of new meeting within A ⊂ J ′ = ((1− β)I{J=J ′} + βI{J 6=J ′}) ∫i∈A kidi∫
i∈J ′ kidi
.
where, as usual, I{.} denotes an indicator variable.
We first study the effects from integrating communities moderately. We then explore,
through an example, the multiplicity of equilibria arising when most interaction takes place
across communities. Throughout, we focus the analysis on the more interesting case where
the equilibrium protection rate in a homogenous population with type θJ is interior, i.e.
V (θJ) ∈ (0, 1), J ∈ {H,L}.10
Consider first β = 0. When β = 0, results from Proposition 3, concerning homogenous
populations, apply. Equilibrium is unique and entails strictly higher incidence in community
L than in community H.
Consider now a small increase in β. Other things equal, an individual in community H
faces higher incidence compared to β = 0, since he will interact with some probability with an
individual from community L where the incidence is higher. This raises incentives to protect
in community H. By symmetry, an individual in community L now faces lower incidence
since he will interact, with some probability, with an individual in community H where the
incidence is lower. This lowers incentives to protect in community L. Integrating communities
moderately therefore benefits L types: As integration grows, the burden of protection tends
9For consistency, and to abstract from issues regarding community size, we assume that if interaction in
community J is greater than it is in community J ′ then only a fraction of individuals in community J interact
across communities. This ensures in a simple way that total interaction from community J to J ′ equals total
interaction from J ′ to J . Formally, if
∫
i∈J kidi >
∫
i∈J′ kidi then partition community J as J1
⋃
J2 such that∫
i∈J1 kidi =
∫
i∈J′ kidi, and individuals in J2 interact within J2 only.
10The analysis of the other cases is similar, but the results are plainer. For instance if V (θH) = V (θL) = 0
then for any β, equilibrium is unique and entails all individuals in both communities remaining unprotected.
Similarly, if V (θH) = V (θL) = 1 then for any β, equilibrium is unique and entails all individuals in both
communities protecting.
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to fall on H types, while L types free-ride. The next proposition summarizes these insights,
and explores their implications for interaction and infection in the two communities.
Proposition 5 Consider a heterogenous population and suppose that V (θJ) ∈ (0, 1), J ∈
{H,L}. Then an equilibrium exists for all β, and is unique over a range [0, β], where
β ∈ (0, 1/2]. Moreover, over this range, increasing β induces (i) higher (lower) protection
in community H (in community L), (ii) lower (higher) infection rate in community H (in
community L) and (iii) a cross-sectional increase (decrease) in interaction within community
H (within community L).
We explained Part (i) above. We now develop the intuition underlying parts (ii) and (iii).
By continuity, for low values of β the unique equilibrium is interior in both communities. So,
for small values of β, individuals in each community must remain indifferent between protec-
tion and no protection. The payoffs of unprotected individuals therefore remain unchanged
as we vary β. Since these payoffs are strictly falling in the incidence of the disease, this
implies that the incidence faced by individuals in both communities must remain unaffected
by changes in β. This in turn implies that, in each community, susceptible interaction must
be unchanged, and so must their probability of infection. However, since the protection rate
grows (falls) in H (L), the fraction of infected individuals must in fact decrease (increase)
in community H (L). Finally, the arguments above establish that more integration induces
higher protection in community H but no reduction of interaction by unprotected individuals
in that community. Hence, an increase in β induces a cross-sectional increase in interaction
by community H. Similar reasoning establishes the claim for community L.
Proposition 5 has interesting implications. To illustrate, suppose that prior to the stage at
which individuals make a decision a social planner is able to allocate vaccines to a small subset
of the population. If communities are largely segregated (β small), the unique equilibrium is
interior in both communities. Any allocation of the social planner therefore induces complete
crowding-out of private incentives, leaving the resulting equilibrium unaffected. Suppose, on
the other hand, that communities are sufficiently integrated so that in the unique equilib-
rium all individuals in community H protect while all individuals in community L remain
unprotected. In this case, allocating protection to high types once again crowds-out private
incentives, whereas allocating vaccines to low types strictly improves welfare in the result-
ing equilibrium, due to the positive externalities from protection within community L. More
generally, targeting individuals valuing interaction least tends to minimize crowding-out in
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our model and as such, somewhat counter-intuitively, makes it attractive for public policy to
protect individuals valuing social interaction least.
We have so far focused on the case of limited integration between communities. For greater
integration there will typically exist multiple equilibria. To bring out this point in the simplest
way, we consider an example where β = 1. We concentrate on the range of parameters where
the isolated communities would have interior equilibria. Then in the case of integration,
there exist three equilibria. The first equilibrium is interior in both communities. The other
two equilibria are extremal: all individuals protect in one of the two communities, while
all individuals remain unprotected in the other. In these equilibria, a protected individual
interacts only with unprotected individuals, and vice versa. Protection is thus attractive for
those who do protect, while remaining unprotected is optimal under the guarantee never to
meet an infected individual. In this setting, it is possible to show that social welfare is highest
in the corner equilibrium where the H type protect and the L type do not protect. The details
of the computations are provided in the appendix.
5 Conclusion
Social and economic interaction generate rewards but also facilitate the spread of infections
and diseases. Individuals can respond to this risk by restricting interaction and by investing
in protection. This paper develops a model that examines the trade-off between these two
actions and the implications for the prevalence of infections.
We study a setting in which a disease may be contracted either through direct infection
or through contact with an infected individual. Individuals decide on how much to interact
with others and whether to protect themselves. We study the equilibrium levels of protection
and interaction and the population rate of infection.
We establish that there exists a unique equilibrium. We then derive a number of interest-
ing implications of the co-determination of interaction and protection. There is a threshold
property with regard to the effects of contagiousness of the disease. Below a threshold level,
interaction falls in contagiousness, while it rises above the threshold. Infection rates too may
move non-monotonically: below a threshold level they rise in contagiousness and above the
threshold they fall with contagiousness.
In the basic model, all individuals are homogenous. We extend the model to study a
society composed of two communities that differ in their returns from interaction – High and
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Low. Individuals in isolated communities exhibit different behavior: the High community
has a higher rate of protection and interaction. As communities integrate, protection and
interaction further increase in the High community while they fall in the Low community.
Integration thus leads to lower (higher) disease prevalence in the High (Low) community.
6 Appendix
Consider a homogenous population. Define the pure interaction game given protection rate V
(PIGGV) as the game played among unprotected individuals choosing how much to interact
when the remaining fraction V of the population protects. Let qi(ku;V ) denote the incidence
of the disease facing individual i in the PIGGV, when other unprotected individuals interact
according to ku. Note that qi(ku;V ) = p−i.zi, where zi is the probability that an arbitrary
meeting of i is with an unprotected individual and p−i is the probability that an unprotected
individual is in fact infected. Since the population is composed of a continuum of individuals,
notice that p−i = p and zi = z, where z = ku(1− V )/(ku(1− V ) + kV ). Moreover, using (4)
yields p = + (1− )αpzku and, upon rearrangement
p =

1− (1− )αzku . (11)
This shows, in particular, that qi(ku;V ) = p.z strictly increases in ku (z increases in ku, while
p is increasing in each of z and ku).
The payoffs of individual i in the PIGGV as a function of ki as well as other players’
actions k−i can be written
Πi(ki, k−i) =
(
1− pi(ki, qi(k−i;V ))
)
r(ki) (12)
where pi(ki, qi(k−i;V )) = + (1− )αq(k−i;V )ki. Taking cross derivatives yields
∂Πi
∂ki∂k−i
= −α(1− ) ∂qi
∂k−i
(
r(ki) + kir
′(ki)
)
(13)
The PIGGV is thus a game of strategic substitutes. Standard considerations then establish
that an equilibrium of the PIGGV exists, is unique, and symmetric (uniqueness and symmetry
follow the fact that the incidence of the disease is the same for all individuals, together with
the strict concavity of payoffs with respect to interaction). Let in what follows Π(V ) denote
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the equilibrium payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV. The next lemma
is useful:
Lemma 1 Π(V ) is continuously differentiable.
Proof: First we show that ku(V ) – the equilibrium interaction of unprotected individuals in
the PIGGV – is continuously differentiable. Using first order conditions yields a continuously
differentiable G(., .) implicitly defining ku(V ) through the equation G(ku(V ), V ) = ku(V ).
Hence, using the Implicit Function Theorem shows that ku(V ) is continuously differentiable.
Next, note that qi(ku;V ) (the incidence of the disease facing individual i in the PIGGV,
when other unprotected individuals interact according to ku) is continuously differentiable.
The equilibrium value of the incidence of the disease in the PIGGV, q(V ), is thus continuously
differentiable too since q(V ) = qi(ku(V );V ).
The proof is concluded by noting that the probability of infection is continuously differen-
tiable in the incidence q, while the returns from interaction are continuously differentiable in
ku.

Proof of Proposition 1: Our proof uses the analysis of the PIGGV given above. Recall
that Π(V ) denotes the equilibrium payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV.
By vaccinating, an individual achieves payoff r(k) − γ. Thus, an equilibrium of the overall
game with protection rate V and in which unprotected individuals interact according to ku
exists if and only if ku is the equilibrium interaction of unprotected individuals in the PIGGV
and:
1. if V = 0 then Π(0) > r(k)− γ;
2. if V = 1 then Π(1) < r(k)− γ;
3. if V ∈ (0, 1) then Π(V ) = r(k)− γ.
Next, we claim that Π(V ) is strictly increasing in V . To establish the claim, we first show
that q(V ) – the equilibrium value of the incidence of the disease in the PIGGV – strictly
decreases in V . Suppose, for a contradiction, that q(V ) increases in V . Each unprotected
individual would then find it in his best interest to interact (weakly) less following a rise in
V , i.e. ku must decrease in V . Since z = ku(1− V )/(ku(1− V ) + kV ), this also implies that
z must strictly decrease in V (more individuals protect, and unprotected individuals interact
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less). But then, by (11) (giving p as a function of z and ku), each unprotected individual must
exhibit strictly lower probability of contracting the disease following a rise in V . We have
thus established that if q(V ) increases in V , then both z and p must strictly decrease in V .
But q = zp, so that q(V ) must strictly decrease in V too – an obvious contradiction. Hence,
q(V ) – the equilibrium value of the incidence of the disease in the PIGGV – strictly decreases
in V . The maximum payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV thus strictly
increases in V . This establishes that Π(V ), the equilibrium payoff achieved by unprotected
individuals in the PIGGV, strictly increases in V .
Combining the first part of the proof with the fact that Π(V ) strictly increases in V
establishes existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. Specifically:
1. if Π(0) > r(k)− γ then V = 0 in the unique equilibrium;
2. if Π(1) < r(k)− γ then V = 1 in the unique equilibrium;
3. if Π(0) < r(k) − γ < Π(1) then the equilibrium protection rate is uniquely determined
by
Π(V ) = r(k)− γ. (14)

Proof of Proposition 2: We begin with Part 1. Let Π1(V ) denote the payoffs of unprotected
individuals with fixed interaction k when a fraction V of the population protects. Fixing V ,
note that the probability z of meeting an unprotected individual is strictly greater with fixed
interaction than in the PIGGV. Since, by (11), p is increasing in each of z and ku this also
implies that the probability of infection is strictly greater with fixed interaction than in the
PIGGV as is ultimately, the incidence q = zp. This establishes that Π(V ), the maximum
payoff achieved by unprotected individuals (in equilibrium) in the PIGGV, must be greater
than Π1(V ). That V ∗ ≤ V 1, where V ∗/ V 1 denote the equilibrium protection rate under
adaptive/fixed interaction, now follows immediately (V ∗/ V 1 are uniquely determined by the
intersection of the strictly increasing functions Π(V )/ Π1(V ) with r(k)− γ).
We next prove Part 2. V ∗ and V 1 ∈ (0, 1) implies that in both cases (fixed and adaptive)
the equilibrium payoffs achieved by unprotected individuals equal r(k)−γ. Since for any given
value of the incidence the option to adapt interaction raises the maximum payoffs attainable
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by unprotected individuals, we must have q∗ > q1. The proof is concluded by noting that
I∗ − I1 = p∗(1− V ∗)− p1(1− V 1)
= p∗[(1− V ∗) + z∗ − z∗]− p1[(1− V 1) + z1 − z1]
= [q∗ − q1] + p∗[(1− V ∗)− z∗]
> 0.
The last equality follows from noting that (1− V 1) = z1. The inequality is due to the remark
above that q∗ > q1, and the observation that (1− V ∗)− z∗ > 0.

Proof of Proposition 3: The proof is in three parts. We first establish dq(θ)/dθ < 0.
We then show that dV (θ)/dθ > 0. Finally, we show that with payoffs given by (2) then
dI(θ)/dθ < 0.
Part 1: Let p(ki, qi) denote the infection probability of i interacting according to ki and facing
incidence qi (notice that, fixing ki, the probability of infection is independent of θi). Observe
that ∂p/∂qi > 0.
The equilibrium indifference condition between vaccinating or not can be written as
θg(k)− γ =
(
1− p(ku(θ), q(θ))
)
θg(ku(θ)) (15)
where ku(θ) and q(θ) denote equilibrium values for unprotected interaction and incidence, as
a function of type θ. Differentiating with respect to θ yields
g(k) =
(
1− p(ku(θ), q(θ))
)
g(ku(θ))− ∂p
∂q
dq
dθ
θg(ku(θ)) (16)
where we have used the fact that ku(θ) is optimal for unprotected individuals, given q(θ).
Hence
dq
dθ
= −
g(k)−
(
1− p(ku(θ), q(θ))
)
g(ku(θ))
∂p
∂q
θg(ku(θ))
. (17)
Step 1 is concluded by noting that both numerator and denominator in the expression above
are strictly positive.
Part 2: First notice using (10) that the first Part of the proof implies dku(θ)/dθ > 0 (lower
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incidence reduces the marginal cost of interaction). Suppose now for a contradiction that
dV (θ)/dθ ≤ 0. Since z = ku(1− V )/(ku(1− V ) + kV ), we obtain dz(θ)/dθ > 0. This in turn
yields dp(θ)/dθ > 0, where we have used (11). Finally, since q = zp, we obtain dq(θ)/dθ > 0,
contradicting step 1. This establishes dV (θ)/dθ > 0.
Part 3: Notice that I(θ) = p(θ)(1 − V (θ)), where p(θ) = p(ku(θ), q(θ)). Since by Part 2
we have dV (θ)/dθ > 0 then dp(θ)/dθ ≤ 0 ⇒ dI(θ)/dθ < 0. Straightforward computations
based on (2) establish ku(θ) = (2αq(θ))
−1. The proof is concluded by noting that in this case
p(θ) = + (1− )αq(θ)ku(θ) = (1 + )/2.

Proof of Proposition 4: Our proof exploits the impact of α on the equilibrium of the
PIGGV. Specifically, we first show that a rise in α induces a rise in the equilibrium value
of the externality α.q(V ;α) in the PIGGV. We then go on to show that Π(V ;α), the equi-
librium payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV, strictly decreases in the
contagiousness α. Finally we show that a (uniform) fall of the equilibrium payoff achieved by
unprotected individuals in the PIGGV implies a rise in the equilibrium protection rate of the
overall game.
Step 1: Let α2 > α1, and fix V . Let q(V ;α) denote the equilibrium incidence in the PIGGV
under contagiousness α. Suppose for a contradiction that α2.q(V ;α2) ≤ α1.q(V ;α1). An
unprotected individual would then find it optimal to interact at least as much under α2 as
under α1 (due to lower marginal cost of interaction). Since V is fixed, we must then have
z2 ≥ z1. But then, from the probability equation in (11), each unprotected individual has
higher probability of infection under α2. Given that q = zp, this implies q(V ;α2) ≥ q(V ;α1),
and ultimately α2.q(V ;α2) > α1.q(V ;α1) – contradicting our original assumption. Thus a rise
in α induces a rise in the equilibrium externality α.q(V, α) in the PIGGV.
Step 2: From step 1, the (PIGGV) equilibrium value of α.q(V ;α) strictly increases in α. In
equilibrium, the maximum payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV thus
strictly decreases in α. This implies that Π(V ;α), the equilibrium payoff achieved by unpro-
tected individuals in the PIGGV, strictly decreases in α.
Step 3: In the proof of Proposition 1 it was shown that the equilibrium protection rate V is
determined by the intersection of (the strictly increasing function of V ) Π(V ;α) and r(k)−γ.
From step 2, we know that Π(V, α) is strictly decreasing in α. For equilibrium, it then follows
that the protection rate V must increase in α. Specifically, there exist α and α, α ≤ α, such
that in equilibrium: V = 0 if α < α, V ∈ (0, 1) if α ∈ [α, α], and V = 1 if α > α. (Notice
that in our setting, V = 1 is not sustainable in equilibrium, and so α = 1).
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We can now conclude the proof of the proposition. Let α and α be as defined in step
3. Consider first α < α. The equilibrium protection rate is V = 0. It follows that (in the
overall game) the equilibrium value of the externality is α.q(0;α). From step 1, α.q(0;α)
strictly increases in α. From the optimization problem (10), the equilibrium interaction ku of
unprotected individuals thus strictly decreases in α. Consider next α ∈ [α, α]. We have over
this range V ∈ (0, 1); so individuals are indifferent between vaccinating or not vaccinating.
The maximum payoff attainable by unprotected individuals is thus r(k) − γ over the entire
range – the payoff they could achieve by vaccinating. Since the maximum payoff attainable
by unprotected individual is strictly decreasing in the externality α.q, the equilibrium value
of α.q must remain constant over the whole range α ∈ [α, α]. This in turn implies that over
this range (i) the equilibrium incidence q strictly decreases, (ii) the equilibrium interaction ku
of unprotected individuals remains constant, and (iii) the equilibrium probability of infection
p remains constant too. Since q = zp, the equilibrium value of z thus strictly falls over this
range. The identity
V =
ku(1− z)
ku + z(k − ku)
(18)
then shows that V strictly rises over this range. Finally, for α > α all individuals protect in
equilibrium, and each individual interacts according to k.

Proof of Proposition 5: The proof of existence follows along the lines of Proposition 1,
and is therefore omitted. We next show that an equilibrium is unique (and interior in both
communities) for β positive but small.
The equilibrium protection rates for homogenous populations V (θJ) ∈ (0, 1), J ∈ {H,L}.
At β = 0, the unique equilibrium is thus interior in both communities. Let QJ denote the
incidence within community J , i.e.
QJ =
∫
i∈J (1− vi)pikidi∫
i∈J kidi
. (19)
Making β and Q−J into parameters and focusing on community J we can – by analogy with
the analysis of homogenous populations – define within community J the pure interaction game
given protection rate VJ . This is a game played among unprotected individuals in community
J choosing how much to interact when the remaining fraction VJ of community J protects,
a fraction β of interaction occurs across communities, and the incidence of the disease in the
other community is Q−J . Let Π(VJ ; β,Q−J) denote the equilibrium payoff achieved by the
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players in this game; notice that Π(VJ ; 0, Q−J) = Π(VJ), where Π(VJ) denotes the equilibrium
payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV of Proposition 1. Repeating the
same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1 establishes that Π(VJ ; β,Q−J) is strictly increasing
in VJ . Taylor expanding yields
Π(VJ ; β,Q−J) = Π(VJ ; 0, Q−J) +O(β) = Π(VJ) +O(β). (20)
The payoff to protected individual in community J is rJ(k)−γ ∈ (Π(0),Π(1)), J ∈ {H,L},
since the unique equilibrium in a homogenous population of type θ is interior for both types θ =
θH and θ = θL. This implies, by (20), that for β small rJ(k)−γ ∈ (Π(0, β,Q−J),Π(1, β,Q−J)),
J ∈ {H,L}, and arbitrary Q−J . Hence, for β small any equilibrium of our game must be
interior for both communitys (i.e. VJ ∈ (0, 1), J ∈ {H,L}).
Lastly, we show that, for any β, at most one equilibrium exists that is interior for both
communities. In an interior equilibrium for both communities, an individual in community J
must be indifferent between vaccinating and not vaccinating. The payoff from protection is
constant, and so is the payoff to an unprotected individual. The payoffs to an unprotected
individual are strictly falling in disease incidence, so an individual in community J must be
facing a constant incidence q(θJ) (recall here that q(θJ) denotes the equilibrium incidence
in a homogenous population with type θJ). An interior equilibrium thus entails q(θJ) =
βQ−J + (1− β)QJ , J ∈ {H,L}. Solving for QJ , J ∈ {H,L}, yields
QH =
1
2
[q(θL) + q(θH) +
q(θL)− q(θH)
2β − 1 ] (21)
QL =
1
2
[q(θL) + q(θH)− q(θL)− q(θH)
2β − 1 ]. (22)
QH and QL are thus uniquely determined. Since individuals in community J face q(θJ),
interaction of unprotected individuals in community J is uniquely determined too, as is the
probability of infection for these individuals. Equation (19) now determines VJ . This suffices
to show that at most one equilibrium exists that is interior for both communities.
We next establish parts 1-3 of the Proposition.
From Proposition 3, we know that incidence is falling in type of population; so q(θL) −
q(θH) > 0. Using (21)-(22), in equilibrium, QH is therefore strictly decreasing in β while QL
is strictly increasing. Since individuals in community J face q(θJ) throughout, interaction of
unprotected individuals in community J remains fixed (in equilibrium) as we vary β. Simi-
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larly, as we vary β, the probability that an unprotected individual becomes infected remains
constant. An inspection of the expression for QJ in (19) reveals that changes in incidence
must occur entirely through adjustments in the rate of protection, VJ . VH therefore strictly
increases in β while VL strictly decreases. This establishes part 1 of the Proposition.
Next consider Part 2: Observe that infection depends on the rate of protection and the
level of interaction of the unprotected. As we vary β, the is rising in community H and falling
in community L, while the interaction remains constant in both communities.
Finally, consider part 3: It follows then that an increase in β induces a cross-sectional
increase in interaction of community H and a cross-sectional decrease in interaction in com-
munity L.

Derivations for the case β = 1: q(θJ), recall, denotes the equilibrium incidence of the
disease in a homogenous population with type θJ . We first show that q(θJ) ∈ (0, ) implies
V (θJ) ∈ (0, 1), i.e. that the unique equilibrium in a homogenous population with type θJ is
interior. V (θJ) = 1 is impossible, as this would imply q(θJ) = 0. V (θJ) = 0, on the other hand,
would imply q(θJ) = p(θJ), the equilibrium probability of infection for unprotected individuals.
Thus, by (4), q(θJ) >  (recall,  is the probability of contracting the disease exogenously),
contradicting our initial assumption. This finishes to establish that V (θJ) ∈ (0, 1), J ∈ {H,L}.
Since the unique equilibrium in a homogenous population is interior for both types, indi-
viduals of type θJ are exactly indifferent between vaccinating or not when facing the incidence
q(θJ). By the same token, they strictly prefer vaccinating if facing q > q(θJ), and strictly
prefer remaining unprotected if facing q < q(θJ).
As in Proposition 5, let qJ denote the incidence facing individuals in community J and QJ
the incidence within community J . Thus here qJ = Q−J , since an individual in community
J interacts exclusively with individuals in communities −J . Suppose an equilibrium exists in
which some individual in community J protects. We will first show that if all individuals in
community −J remain unprotected, then it must be that all individuals in community J in
fact protect. We will then show that if some individual in community −J protects, then the
equilibrium must be interior.
If all individuals in community −J remain unprotected, each of them must be infected
with probability  at least , inducing qJ = Q−J ≥ . But q(θJ) < , so if all individuals in
community −J remain unprotected then all individuals in community J must protect. This
in turn makes it optimal for individuals in community −J not to protect.
Next, suppose that some individual in −J protects. We must then have q−J = QJ ≥
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q(θ−J). Since q(θ−J) > 0, some individual in community J must therefore be unprotected.
Thus, in community J , some individuals protects while others do not. By symmetry, the
same must then be true for community −J . This shows that if some individual in community
−J protects, then the equilibrium must be interior in both communities. Furthermore, this
equilibrium is fully characterized by the condition QJ = q(θ−J), J ∈ {H,L}. The arguments
above establish that there exist exactly three equilibria, satisfying the description given in the
statement of the Proposition.
Proof of welfare ranking: Let W1, W2 and W3 be the average social welfare in the three
equilibria identified above. We establish that W1 > W2 > W3.
As in Proposition 3, let p(ki, qi) denote the infection probability of i interacting according
to ki and facing incidence qi. We then have
W1 =
1
2
(
θHg(k)− γ
)
+
1
2
(
1− p(ku(θL), 0)
)
θLg(ku(θL)) (23)
W2 =
1
2
(
1− p(ku(θH), 0)
)
θHg(ku(θH)) +
1
2
(
θLg(k)− γ
)
(24)
where ku(θJ) denotes the optimal interaction of unprotected individual in community J facing
zero incidence. Thus W1 −W2 = 1/2[T (θH)− T (θL)], where
T (θ) =
(
θg(k)− γ
)
−
(
1− p(ku(θ), 0)
)
θg(ku(θ)). (25)
Differentiating yields
dT
dθ
= g(k)−
(
1− p(ku(θ), 0)
)
g(ku(θ)) (26)
where we have used the fact that ku(θ) is optimal for an unprotected individual in community
J facing zero incidence. But then, clearly, dT
dθ
> 0 and so W1 > W2.
That both W1 and W2 are strictly greater than W3 follows from the observation that
W3 = 1/2(θHg(k)− γ) + 1/2(θLg(k)− γ), while the maximum payoff attained by unprotected
individuals is strictly greater when facing zero incidence than when facing q(θJ) > 0 in an
interior equilibrium.

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